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Memorandum to file 
LFP, JR. 
-
SUBJECT: 82-1005 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC (and related 
cases No. 82-1247 and 82-1591). 
If appears from the papers in this case that Vepco was 
among a group of about eighty electric power companies that 
intervened in 82-1247. The papers do not indicate that 
Vepco remains in the case. 
I called Evans Brasfield, General Counsel of Vepco, who 
advised me as follows: Although Vepco did intervene below, 
it no longer has any significant interest in the case and is 
not a party to the ongoing litigation. He also stated that 
of the about eighty electric utilities that constituted the 
group, Vepco's interest probably was the least significant. 
In substance, he advised that Vepco has little or no 
interest in the case at the present time, and sees no reason 
for me to disqualify. 
My clerk, Jim Browning, has checked the other parties 
and finds no conflict. 
LFP, JR. 
- -
May 17, 1983 
82-1005 Chevron v. ~atural Resources Def~nse ~ouncil 
Dear. Al: 
q. ~· 
Please mark the public recordR to rPflect that I am now 
in the above case which_ appears on page l of the Conference 
for May 19 . 
Mr. Alexanoer Stev;;is 
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
May 19, 1983 Conference 








INC., et al. 
Cert to CADC (Mikva, Ginsburg, 
Jameson [DJ]) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
Please see the preliminary memorandum in No. 82-1005. 
There is a response. 
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INC., et al. 
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SAME 
/~ 
SUMMARY: Petrs challenge the CADC's invalidation of the 
EPA's "bubble conce_Pt" under which the word "source" in Part D of 
the Clean Air Act means an entire plant. Under previous EPA 
regulations, the word "source" meant an individual piece of 
process equipment within the plant. 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: As part of the 1970 amendments to 
the Clean Air Act, Congress directed the EPA to prescribe 
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQSs), and required all 
states to adopt, and submit to the EPA for approval, State 
Imp ~ t ~! ion Plan~ that would indicate timely attainment 
of the NAAQSs. It soon became evident that many states would 
fail to attain the NAAQSs within the statutory deadline. In 
1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to address areas of the 
country that were not expected to attain the NAAQS~ 'f 
the Act was added to require states with to 
submit revised SIPs demonstrating that the NAAQSs would be 
attained "as expeditiously as practicable," but not later than 
Dedember 31, 1982, or "if the State demonstrates to the 
satisfaction of the Administrator ••• that such attainment is not 
• - - 3 - -
possible in an area with respect to either [ozone or carbon 
monoxide] ••• not later than December 31, 1987." Until the 
NAAQSs are attained, "reasonable further progress towards the 
standards must occur in each year." 
Two aspects of Part D precipitated the issue in this case. 
S h;.,t::i... ~ ,--~ ... ud-~ 77~-,c_. 
First, Part D requires that SIPs establish a permit program for 
___.-,. 
the construction and operation of new or modified "major 
=-stationary sources" in nonattainment areas. States may issue a 
~
permit for construction modifications of a major source only if 
! 
four conditions are met. Application of this four-part test is 
~
called "new source review." Second, if the nonattainment area 
lacks an approved SIP meeting Part D's requirements, a 
construction moratorium becomes operative and no major stationary 
source can be constructed in the area. 
Part D does not explicitly define the term "stationary 
'---- " 
source" and the EPA has twice construed it in regulations. In - - ----- --1980, the EPA defined the term to mean "any building, structure, 
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air 
pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." This regulation 
further defined "building, structure, [and] facility" to mean, 
essentially, a rllentire plan~~ "Installation," however, was 
defined as "an identifiable piece of process equipment." Thus, a 
"source" could be either an entire plant or an individual piece 
of equipment at a plant. The reason for this "dual definition" 
was the EPA's determinitaf on that Congress intended Part D to 
. It 
subject to review more new construction projects in areas with 








- 4 -- -~~~-
prevent deterioration o air. These regulations also 
provided that reco7'ructed facilities, facilities where the cost 
50% of an entirely new source, would be 
treated 
the EPA replaced the dual definition for new source 
✓ __ _::..__------;;,,,-;-✓------------:\:--:-l.- -
I 
r ev i ew in nonattainment areas with a plantwide definition of - ' 
"stationary source." This is known as the "bubble concept." 
~
This change was made to reduce perceived regulatory comp lexity 
and to allow the states to play a primary role in pollution 
control. The 1981 regulations also deleted the requirement that ---
reconstructed facilities should be treated as new sources. Resps 
filed a petn for review of the 1981 regulations. 
The CADC viewed the question as whether the EPA's discretion 
under the Clean Air Act is broad enough to allow it to apply the 
concept to Part D's nonattainment program. The CADC felt 
itself bound by two of its previous decisons on this topic. 
First, the decision in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F. 2d 323 
(CADC 1979), held that the EPA must apply the bubble concept to 
the regulatory scheme under Part C of the Act. Part C 
establishes the Prevention of Significant Deterioration component 
of the Act that is designed to maintain air quality in clean 
areas. The bubble concept was viewed as "precisely suited" to 
the goals of Part C; "preserving air quality within a framework 
that allows cost-effiient, flexible planning for industrial 
expansion and improvement." A more specific definition of 
"source" was not necessary to implement Part C. 
II, 
~ ?-,,--




The second control ling decision v. EPA ~ 578 
F. 2d 319 (CADC 1978). 
C: 
In that case, the court rejeted 
-~ 
application oft~ bubble concept to nationQl "new source - -
performance standards" which the Act directs the EPA to set with 
a view to enhancing air quality. When the Act directs that air I 
q ~ality is to---!:.: improv.=..;1 , rather than merely maintained, the 
bubble concept is inappropriate because it would allow operators 
to avoid installing the best pollution control technology as long 
as the emissions from the entire plant do not increase. The 
Alabama Power court reconciled its decision with ASARCO by noting 
the difference between preserving air quality, as mandated by 
Part C, and enhancing air quality, as required by "new 
performance standards." The term "source" could properly have 
different meanings under each of these different regulatory 
schemes. 
The CADC read these two cases to "establish as the law of ----' ( \• 
this Circuit a bright line test for determining the propriety of 
EPA's resort to a bubble concept. The bubble concept, Alabama 
Power declares, is mandatory for Clean Air Act programs designed 
merely to maintain existing air quality; it is inappropriate, 
both ASARCO and Alabama Power plainly signal, in programs enacted 
to improve the quality of the ambient air." The bubble concept 
was thus inappropriately applied to Part D's nonattainment scheme 
because the purpose of that scheme is to improve air quality in 
regions that fall below the NAAQSs. 
:$'G~ 
The EPA arguea that the court misperceived the nature of the 
~
nonattainment program. The EPA urged that the bubble concept 
fl~ _.,,,--
~ 
- 0 -- -
would leave the states considerable latitude to define "source" 
.., ---- --
as they saw fit. However, regardless of the definition adopted --------by a state, the state would still have to submit and comply with 
a revised SIP that assures air ~uality. Timely compliance with 
the NAAQSs, the primary purpose underlying Part D, would thus be 
achieved. The CADC rejected this argument on the ground that 
offering flexibility to the states did not change the fact that 
Part D's goal was to enhance air quaility. Consequently, the 
Alabama Power-ASARCO rule invalidated the bubble concept. 
Further, the court could not reconcile the EPA's desire to allow 
the states large leeway to define "source" with the fact that 
Part D contains wholly federal requirements imposed on the 
states. The CADC vacated the 1981 regulations, including the 
EPA's deletion of the rule that reconstructed facilities should 
be treated as new sources. 
CONTENTIONS: 1. Chevron USA, Inc. Chevron argues that 
cert should be granted to "rescue both the regulators and the 
regulated from the legal quagmire created by the" CADC. Chevron 
asserts that Alabama Power and Asarco are irreconcilable. 
Finally, Chevron argues that the CADC has simply substituted its 
judgment for that of the EPA. 
2. American Iron and Steel Institute. These petrs argue 
that the CADC decision inhibits reasonable economic growth in 
nonattainment areas and thus impedes the nation's ability to 
recover from the current recession. The EPA determined that its 
"dual definition" was an ~ conomic disincentive t ith little or no -
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plant-wide modifications were permitted so long as plant-wide 
emissions did not increase. This is all that is required by Part 
D. Further, the CADC decision is inconsistent with the notion 
that the Clean Air Act places primary responsibility for assuring 
air quality on the states. See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 
( 19 7 5) • 
3. The SG. The S~ s arguments center on the notion that 
the CADC exceeded the limits upon the scope of judicial review of 
administrative action. Congress has consistently provided that 
the states should have primary responsibility for the control and 
prevention of air pollution. The addition of Part D to the Clean 
Air Act in 1977 is not an exception to this policy. The EPA's 
construction of the undefined term "source" in Part D accords the 
states, within Part D's broad outlines, the authority to define 
"source" in a way that will best enable it to ahcieve attainment. 
The EPA's policy does not permit a state to adopt the bubble 
concept unless any increased emissions at a particular site are 
offset by decreased emission from another component within the 
same facility. Thus, the states are accorded the flexibility to 
determine how to structure their source review programs only if 
Part D's attainment requirements are met. 
The SG also argues that the "bright line" established by 
ASARCO and Alabama Power has no basis in the Act. Neither the 
statutory text nor its legislative history requires that "source" 
be defined differently depending on whether one is seeking 
ehancement or maintenance of existing air quality. 
0~ 
/J,,-
- - 8 - -
The SG finally argues that cert should be gr ,:tnted because M 
states have sought to adopt bubble concept approaches to new 
source review. The CADC opinion would require the EPA to 
disapprove these proposals. 
4. Resps. Resps note that this is a simple case of 
statutory construction that does not warrant this Court's 
attention. Congress has assigned review of Clean Air Act 
regulations to the CADC to assure national uniformity in the law; 
there is no need for further review of this case by this Court. 
In any event, resps argue that the CADC decision is correct. 
First, the 1977 "nonattainment" amendments to the Clean Air Act 
were passed to allow certain extremely polluted areas a little 
more time to come within clean air standards. This leeway was 
accorded, however, only so long as the affected states adopted 
stringent guidelines governing construction of new sources. New 
sources must be subjected to a four-step "new source review" that 
will help assure that the polluted area will be brought into 
compliance as soon as possible. The CADC decicsion simply 
construes the term "source" in a manner that best implements 
Congress' intent. Resps also note that Congress is currently 
considering legislation to amend the Act and can repudiate the 
CADC's construction if it so desires. The report of at least one 
Senate committee on these amendments has expressly endorsed the 
CADC opinion: "The court's decision ••• correctly interprets 







DISCUSSION: Although Congress' intent is not entirely 
clear, it seems that the CfoDC has the best of this issue. The -= 
1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act were added only to allow - -certain areas, areas unable realistically to comply with the 
Act's guidelines within prescribed time periods, to continue to 
grow and construct new "sources" only if those sources did not 
hinder attainment of the Act's standards. New sources in such 
nonattainment areas were made subject to a rigorous four-part 
test, to be applied by the states, before they could become 
----' 
operational. It stands to reason that Congress' close scrutiny 
of construction in nonattainment areas is better implemented when 
'J 11 q · 1 d · · f · ·th· · t · 1 t a sources, inc u 1ng spec1 1c sources w1 1n an ex1s 1ng pan, -
are subjected to the statutory test--the CADC's construction of 
the Act is therefore more in accord with Congress' intent than 
are the new EPA guidelines. ? 
~ 
It also appears that the CADC has developed a body of law on 
this issue that should not be lightly cast aside. The 
progression from ASARCO-Alabama Power to this case has 
established a workable legal framework within which the EPA can 
develop guidelines relating to new "sources" under the Act. This 
legal framework is fully supported by the Act and by its 
legislative history and, as resps point out, has been endorsed by 
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. 
I recommend denial. 
There is a response and an amicus brief. 
May 10, 1983 T. Green Opn in petn in No. 82-1005 
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INC., et al. 
Cert to CADC (Mikva, Ginsburg, 
Jameson [DJ]) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
Pleas see the preliminary memorandum in No. 82-1005. 
There is a response. 
May 10, 1983 T. Green Opns in petn in No. 82-1005 
r' ..... - - May 19, 1983 Court ................... . l-'oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 82-1005 No. 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
INC. ~ r"' ,.w.J..., 









Chief Justice until 3/26/83. Also 
undation for leave to file a biref as 
~ 
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JURISDICTION AL 
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FOR G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF· G D 
Burger, Ch. J .......... . ; • ••••l•••••••••l•••••I•••• 
Brennan, J .................... /i ........ , ..... , .... , ........ . 
White, J ............ . .. ,,.,,,. •••[•~ ••••!••• ••!••••!•••• 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -~ .... , .....•... , ... . 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..•.... , ..... , .... , ... . 
Powell, J.................... ·;r ... 1 •••• , ••••• , •••• , •••• 
Rehnquist, J .................... ·r .
11 
.... , ..... , .... , ... . 
Stevens, J ............................•.... , ..... , ...•.... , .... , .... 
O'Connor, J ............. ~ .. :fl , ......... , ..... , .. . 
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e Chief Justice until 3/26/83 . Also 
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Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned ................. . , 19 .. . No. 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ............... . , 19 .. . 
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lfp/ss 02/25/84 CHEVRON SALLY-POW 
82-1005, 82-1247, 82-1591 The Chevron Group of Cases 
As these cases involve an environmental law 
issue of some importance, and the parties probably number 
well into the hundreds, I have been concerned about a 
possible need to disqualify. 
In checking through 
(July 1, 1982 through July 
my disqualification file 
3, 1983), I find that we 
already have carefully checked out this litigation, and I 
do not have to disqualify. 
See, first my letter of December 10, 1982, 
recognizing that Hunton & Williams - at that time - may 
have clients who were interested. Apparently, I asked to 
be "out" at least temporaryily. Next, I find a memo to 
file of May 17, 1983. This indicates that I talked to 
. Evans Brasfield, who advised me that Vepco no longer had 
any significant interest in the case. Moroever, Jim 
Browning checked - with his usual meticulous care - all of 
the parties named and found no conflict. Accordingly, on 
May 17, 1983, I advised Al Stevas that I was in the case. 
In recent conversations with Turner Smith and 
Heny Nichol, both of Hunton & Williams, they confirm that 
there was no reason for me to be out of th Chrevon cases. 
• 
- - 2. 
See Turner Smith's letter of February 8. In 
my conversation with him, he advised that Hunton & 
Williams no longer has any interest in Chemical 
Manfuacturers Associations v. National Resources Defense 
Council, No. 83-1013 - a case filed here on December 19, 
1983, and that will be on the list in March. 
The other two cases mentioned in Turner's letter 
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American Iron and Steel Institute v. NRDC ~
Ruckelshaus v. NRDC #'),-
Nos. 82-1005, 82-1247, 82-1591 
David A. Charny February 28, 1984 
Question Presented 
Whether, under the Clean Air Act, the EPA may allow the 
states to define a "source" as an entire plant, rather than an 
.- .. F -, ~ 
individual piece of equipment, for the purposes of the Act's re-
quirement that "new or modified sources" in nonattainment areas 
qualify for permits under the State Implementation Plan. 
• 




A. Statutory Language 
B. Legislative History 
c. Policies of the Act 
III. Conclusion 









bench memo: Chevron v. NRDC -- - page 3. 
I. Background 
The Clean Air Act, as amended i e requires states 
that have not attained_ compliance with the ambient air quality 
...,_ -- -
standards set by the federal government to adopt ~ "new source 
review" (NSR) program. 42 U.S.C. §7502 (b) (6). The program is to 
assure that economic growth does not contribute to increased pol-
lution and thereby delay attainment of the air quality goals 
under the Act. The program applies to any ' ~ew''or 
1
rnod if iecl J /CJ 
77 
"~r~e" of pollution; a "modification" is any change in an ex- ~
isting source that increases the amount of pollution. 42 U.S. 
§7501(4). A permit may be issued for construction of a new or ~ 
modified source only if four condition are met: (i) the owner of ~ 
h b
. . . . ~~ 
t e source must o tain reductions in pollution from other sources 
that more than offset that increase attributable to the new 
source; (ii) the source must comply with the "lowest achievable 
emission rate," as set by the state; (iii) other sources under . 
~+,ct~ I'~.flelll"r .. t•+:.•.,. 
the same ownership must also be in compliance; (iv) af C.S r~ is 
being carried out in the nonattainment area. §7503. 
Pf 11" 
,,,,,---- In add i U on, ~ new sources are subject to the require-
p~r ments of t:: "new sour ~ er formance standards" (NSPS) program, 
~~ 
~ 
A a,t-that was instituted in 19JO. These standards, that require new 
J1 sources to adopt the "best available technology" for pollution 
. --Y /)lyVf- control, are applied to new sources uniformly throughout the na-
J-o~ tion. For purposes of the NSPS program, the statute defines 
~-~ "source" as a "any building, structure, facility or installation 
which emits or may emit any air pollutant." §741l(a) (3) . 
) 
bench memo: Chevron v. NRDC - - - page 4. 




40 CFR 51.18(j). Under this definition, whether a change at an ~
~"~ 
existing plant increases pollution -- and is therefore a "modifi-
cation" subject to the four requirements noted above -- is deter-
mined by reference to the f 1ant as a whole J If the increase from 
the new installation is offset by decreases accomplished else-
where in the plant, the new installation is not a "modification" 
of the source. This is t.he (§i'f,6 1e conc"""";pf} " 
The CADC invalidated the "plantwide" definition. Under C~J (. 
CADC precedent, the "bubble concept" had been upheld when the ~ 
goal of the program was to preserve air quality, Alabama Power ~ 
Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (CADC 1979): it had been rejected 
when the goal of the program was to improve air quality, ASARCO, 
Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (CADC 1978). Because the nonattainment 
program was aimed at improving air quality, the plantwide defini-
tion could not be used. 
II. Discussion 
A. Statutory Language ~ ~~of~'~"'i.-., ?a.J-1'} ,,-Jc:L-f 
Unlike Part A of the Clean Air Act, that establishes 
federally-determined "new source performance standards" (NSPS), 
part D of the Act, at issue here, contains no definition of 
9 
"source." Resps contend that Congress incorporated the part A 
d f~ . ;:;k b f . h . ~ e inition into part D y re erring tote part D nonattainment S> 
~ 
program in §7410(a) (2) (D) of part A. That section requires the 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) to include a program "to provide 
• 
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for ••. regulation of the modification •.• of any stationary 
source, including a permit program as required in [part DJ 
This is hardly a very explicit means of incorporating 
the Part A definition of "source" into part D. When Congress 
II 
wished to incorporate the definition of "modification" from part 
~/ A to part D, it expressly so provided in part D. See §7501(4). 
t' 
Further, as will be discussed below, the legislative history and 
the policies of the Act suggest that, absent more express indica- tJtLJ 
tions of legislative intent, it should not be assumed that Con-~ 
gress intended the same definition to apply in parts A and D: ~ :~ 
Conference Committee deleted a provision that would have made irht-~ 
NSPS definition of source applicable to all parts of the A~~ 
the purposes of the NSPS program and the NSR program differ sig-
nificantly. 
In any case, even if Congress defined "source" as 
---. -"building, structure, facility or installation," it is arguable 
that EPA retains discretion to define these terms to refer only 




literal language of 
l;> "any building" that 
This may be difficult to reconcile with the 
the definition; for example, if a source is 
emits pollution, then a plant that consists 
of five buildings, each emitting pollution, would comprise five 
sources. Given the difficulty and importance of the question 
from the viewpoint of environmental policy, however, the Court 
should be reluctant to reach this inflexible conclusion from the 
literal language of the statute in the absence of some indicatio 
that Congress consciously chose that language to express this 
intent. Rather, the list of terms "building, structure, facilit~ 
~ 
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or installation," could be interpreted to indicate Congress's 
intent that the program be comprehensive -- i.e., that all types 
of stationary polluters be covered by the Act. 
A more significant difficulty with EPA's approach is -
that EPA has defined the term "source" inconsistently for differ--
ent sections of part D itself. The plant-wide definition applies 
to §7502 (b) (6), that requires permits for the "construction and 
operation of new or modified major stationary sources in accord-
ance with §7503." The EPA has applied a different definition of 
source, however, to §7503(2), that requires "the proposed source 
••. to comply with the lowest achievable emission rate." For 
§7503(2), EPA regulations construe "source" to mean an "emissions 
unit," defined as "any part of a stationary source which emits 
.•• any pollutant." 40 CFR §51.18 (j) (vii); id., (xiii) (E_). This 
inconsistency of definition gives industry the "best of both 
worlds." Emissions from the entire plant are considered to de-
termine whether the source is subject to the requirements of 
§7503. If those requirements apply, however, they apply only to 
the piece of equipment or part of the plant actually responsible 
for the increased emissions. 
As a matter of policy, it may be difficult to imagine 
that Congress wished to require that an entire plant be revamped 
with new pollution control equipment whenever total emissions 
from the plant increased. But Congress uses the same term --
"source" -- in both §7502(b) (6) and §7503(2). 
definition is implausible for §7503(2), that 
If the plant-wide I 
suggests that the 
definition is unavailable for §7502 (b) (6) as well. There is no 
... 
• 
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basis in the statute for using the plant-wide definition in one 
context and not the other; and, as discussed below, this may be 
inconsistent with the policies behind the Act. 
B. Legislative History 
Resp contends that the terms of earlier versions of the 
Clean Air Act amendments demonstrate that Congress conceived of a 
"source" as a unit within a plant rather than thue plant itself. 
Even if the terms of the 1976 proposals in Congress, that were 
not adopted, and the 1976 EPA regulations do draw such a distinc-
tion explicitly, the fact remains that Congress declined to draw 
this distinction in the amendments that were finally adopted. 
Although the Senate bill contained a provision applying the NSPS 
definition of "source" to all parts of the Act, that provision 
was deleted by the Conference Committee. It is possible, as resp 
suggests, that the deletion was inadvertent, made because the 
Committee thought that it was unnecessary to define "stationary 
source" twice in the Act. Nonetheless, the deletion of provi-
sions that would have required a narrower definition of "source" -
does suggest, at least, that Congress had not focused its atten-
tion on this issue; further, insofar as Congress had adverted to 
the issue, it had decided not to require a specific definition of 
"source." In either case, the EPA definition is consistent with £/2/t..5 
congressional intent. - ~~ 
--- -------- (A. ~k;;:;:t 
Th 
• • ~ ~I 
e d1scuss1on of the amendments in the reports and on ~
the floor also suggest that Congress did not form an clear intent 
on the definition of "source." Certainly there is no reported 
discussion of the question. While statements 
l~? 
by some legislators 
• 
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seemed to assume that "source" would refer to specific installa-
tions or equipment, others refer to entire plants as "sources." 
Y _ The 
~ be the model 
~ some general statements that undermine the EPA's position. 
report on the House bill, that EPA acknowledges to 
-::::::_ __';J -
for the amendments finally enacted, does contain 
~ First, in the section entitled "State Flexibility," the House 
lists several ways in which the bill gives greater flexibility to 
the states, but does not mention the definition of "source." And 
in discussing the "lowest achievable emission rate," the commit-
tee states its conclusion that "all feasible efforts to reduce or 
control this .•. pollution [from new or modified sources] should 
be mandated." It might appear, then, the Committee did not con-
template flexibility in application of the requirements for new 
and expanded sources. But the Committee might not have mentioned 
the states' freedom to define "source" simply because it did not 
realize that this might provide a significant source of flexibil-
ity to the states. And, as discussed below, the plant-wide defi-
nition of source is consistent with "maximum feasible efforts" to 
control pollution as long as the definition is consistently ap-
plied in all sections of the Act. 
C. Policies of the Act 
Resps and the Court of Appeals suggest that the defini-
tion of "source~ must be ~he same for the "new source performance 
standards" and for the "new source review" programs because the 
programs serve the same purposes. It is true that, by requiring 
new or modified sources to enstall the best available technology, 
the programs both attempt to enhance the potential for economic 
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growth and create a market for new pollution control technology. 
Beyond that, however, the goals of the two programs diverge in 
ways that might justify different definitions of "source." 
A major goal of the NSPS was to create a national stand-
ard for new sources, so that a competitive advantage would not 
accrue to industries that were subject to less stringent emis-
sions standards because they were located in states with cleaner 
air. H. Rep. No. 95-294, at 184-185. This goal clearly favors a 
definition more specific than the plant-wide definition, as the 
plant-wide definition would place a much greater burden for con-
trolling pollution upon new plants than upon older plants that 
might be renovated or expanded. The locally-based NSR program is 
unconcerned with national uniformity. To the contrary, one pur-
pose of the section was "to give the States more flexibility in 
determining how to protect public health while still permitting 
reasonable new growth." H. Rep. No. 95-294, at 213. To that 
end, the states were permitted to choose "whatever mix of contin-
uous emission reduction measures and strategies it wants to meet 
the requirements of this section." Id. 
Further, the NSR program, unlike the nationally-based 
new source performance standards, requires new or modified 
sources to contribute to further reductions in level of emissions 
for the non-attainment area. Congress might have considered it 
desirable to leave the states greater flexibility in defining 
"source" in ·this context. The individual states would be in the 
better position to determine, for the types of industry subject 
to regulation, whether emissions could be reduced more efficient-
bench memo: Chevron v. NRDC - - - page 10. 
ly if reductions were required when each installation, narrowly 
defined, was added, or only when the plant as a whole contributed 
to further pollution. And, as each state is required to meet the 
national ambient goals set by EPA, the flexibility left to the 
states is only a matter of means; there is no question that the 
means adopted must be effective to achieve the ends set by the 
Act. 
Finally, the "bubble concept" is clearly a sensible ~ 
means of pollution control. The bubble concept permits each 
plant manager to choose the most efficient means to counterbal-
ance increases in emissions from plants modifications. A more 
specific definition of source requires the plant manager to at-
tain the lowest achievable emission rate -- a standard set with 
little regard to cost, see H. Rep. No. 95-294, at 215 -- for any 
change in plant operation that produces new emissions. The bub-
ble concept permits the manager to counterbalance these new emis-
sions by emission reductions, in other parts of the plant, that 
may be obtained much more efficiently than those that would abe 
required to achieve the "lowest achievable emission rate." 
As noted above with reference to the statutory language, E (.) ;:J.. 
the most disturbing aspect of the EPA's approach is that it ~ 
 
adopts different definitions for determining whether a "source"~ 
pp,-1,J'V is new or modifie and for requiring the "lowest achievable e ~ 
sion rate." Although emissions for the entire plant must in-
crease before the source is "modified," only the particular new 
piece of equipment is required to achieve the lowest achievable 
rate. This appears inconsistent with the congressional intent to 
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require "maximum feasible pollution control," H. Rep. No. 95-294, 
at 215. On the other hand, were the definition of "source" con-
sistent in the EPA regulations, which definition of "source" were 
adopted might make little difference as to the overall impact of 
the program on the level of emissions. While the plant-wide def-
inition of the source might trigger the requirements for new or 
modified "sources" less frequently than an equipment-specific 
definition, the plant-wide definition would require greater ef-
forts at abatement by those plants that did qualify as new or 
modified sources. 
III. Conclusion 
If this case required the Court to review EPA's two def-
initions of "source" -- to determine whether a source is new or 
modified and to determine what piece of equipment must comply -
with the "lowest achievable emisson rate" -- EPA's policy proba---· ---
bly could not be upheld. However, the EPA policy on the "lowest -----
achievable emission rate" was not challenged by resps and does 
not appear to be before the Court. I would not invalidate the 
EPA regulation under review on this basis because the issue is 
not pressed by the parties. The inconsistency does suggest, how-
ever, that EPA's regulation might warrant less deference than is ~ 
generally accorded to agency action. 
Nonetheless, the CA decision should be reversed. Con-
gress expressed no clear intent on the definition of source, and 
the EPA approach is consistent with the language of the statute 
and advances the statute's purposes. The case is close, however, 
as there are contrary indications of congressional intent in the 
bench memo: Chevron v. NRDC -- • page 12. 
legislative history and the statute itself. 
tI~ - -
82-1005 CHEVRON v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 
82-1247 AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE V. 
v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 
82-1591 RUCKELSHAUS v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL Argued 2/29/84 
·111! ~~~~ 
~_31' ~~r,p~Lt, -r-u 
___;.,-pn • I// S °'7 --v::~~~_,, ~
a:-,-,_..~t'~~~ 
~ -,s ->-,,, ,c !;? pz:;;~. ~ ,,....,,..., 
~ ... ,.'?,....,.~,~z;,:ll!!!e:::=---"·~ LL-pl -----rzt 
-~~~ ~ \~ /;/ ~~f; 
~ h ~, ~ ~ 
-16 .. ,-7~.,-;1-~~ 'oi,!J 7 -yJ...,r' 
~, 111~~ ~,~s;-\ ., 
~-?-•?',=,<---
,7y .--~-~ ~?JV --1-77 
( (Y~P L.L ~/ )o ~ 
~ ~ ~-9 .> -,-,-s;.) . ~
~~ -n??e-~ ~ °" LL.~ 1 ~ T'D' YVT->,-,e,,-p ~ iY ~ ;7 -nt.i 
"/J'6/ ~~~ ~~ 
·~/--rt~,,~,,~ \ \ l f 
0-r - ~,--,y ~ -
~ ~ ·~ -f/t/.:il 




'1-.sr 5' /7/-Z~ /'~._Lt?_F•r~ ~ 
v ~ x 
-J;-: ..,_.. <Pp , I.,...,.,,?~~~? ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~ -~~~~~ 
 --r>t/ p-,~ "> ,. ~ »-7 ~ l' ,, , ., -, --, ,, • 
-1~1':"~~~~~~:x,r 
~~=,~~~~ 
~ ~ ·~~,--,,-~~ ~ 
6 ~ -p ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ti/ 
, ~.,.,ff->;;l::;:, ~ "'Y>? ,, ~,, 
/?->.,.. ,..~ >p ---• ~ ./-~ L. L ~ ? () .$ , , , .r-✓ ' 
(-;~ )-,<#-17:?fj 
--
'f--'f.Pb /Y7-f' ~ ~ ~ ?-&1 #.:; ~ . ,,,--_ 
(P1~~~ ~ ~ ~'77!) 
~ ~ /-,, ~ ~ ~ '7 a.t 
h~ -f~ 
, r •P# >?7"? ~ ~ ,,.?-,I~  
..,,..,.,~~~P-~ --r?h' ~~ 7J-~~?::? 
---4-T'~ • -h,7'~-G,1~ 
kz,7,3 ~ Yp--( ,.~~~~ /.,~ 
.,,.,,,p,p,-r, ~,~-1~ ~-t?,,f,/ r>lJ/ti/ 
r~~~·J·~ h? 
,C7'?1 ~o/"Z-" -·~ /-rs? ~£-if~ s 
~G~•zrt:-f 
~ ,as~ f>7 ~ 
·~ 
~~ --;y, ~ & '~ 
~-'~,~fa~~ 
,~ 
. '?7' ~~ ~ ..,-
~ ~ ~ ~ ,,,,">fl?,. ~~••·. r 
---~~r? J ~ ~
~ ~ ~ h:!if .,_~~~ ' -,--
-yJ, ....,. r(.r?> >?-7-f-7 ~; 
~~ ~~ ~ (}-f 
~ ' L.. L, )-., ,._711¢ ~ ~ 
~~?,.~7~~ aL, ~~
~~s:--;:Ps~ 
.s  07 ~,,--,.r $' 
(~~G''"s7-rr1.f )(~)~1';76 
--
dac 03/01/84 - -
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: David 




(1) EPA's two definitions of "source": As we discussed, 
~ a major weakness of the EPA's position is that it has defined 
"source" two ways: the "bubble" definition for determining when a 
_,l 
source is "modified," and a definition focusing on individual 
. - - --------- -------.... 
-- pieces of equipment for determining the "lowest achievable emis-
sion rate" (LAER) to be achieved by the source. 
Re-examining the statute, I think that this contradic-
tion can be resolved, at least as a logical matter. The EPA reg--------ulation on LAER, that appears to contain the second, inconsist-
ent, definition of "source," can be interpreted instead as a def-
' 
inition of "lowest achivable emission rate." For modified 
sources, that rate is defined, in effect, as the rate that is 
achieved for the source -- the plant -- by putting LAER technol-
ogy on the particular piece of equipment that is altered. The 
definition of "source" for the purposes of LAER then remains the 
same as the definition used for determining whether the source is 
modified • 
Interpreted in this way, the regulation does define the 
"lowest achievable emissions rate" differently for new and for 
modified sources. 
achieve~ when each 
~ 
For a new source, that rate is the rate 
piece of equipment is fitted, as required by 
the regulations, with LAER technology; for a modified source, 
only the new pieces of equipment need be so fitted. Such a dis-
- -
tinction, however, is authorized by statute, as the definition of 
the "lowest achievable emissions rate" permits comparison among 
sources in a given "class or category. 111 Judge Leventhal en-..__ 
dorses a like interpretation of this language, in the context of 
the NSPS program, in his concurrence in ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 -- ~ --
F.2d 319, 330 (CADC 1978). 
However, the EPA's definition of "lowest achievable 
emissions rate" does appear arbitrary in that it may not require, 
in all cases, "the most stringent emission limitation which is 
achieved in practice •••• " That depends in practice on the 
"classes" or "categories" established in implementing the regula-
tion. Thus, if the EPA regulations are upheld on this basis, the 
opinion would have to caution the EPA that the classifications 
that are adopted for different categories of modified sources 
must be reasonable: The statute requires that one "modified" 
source achieve ' the same emissions rate as other comparable 
sources. 
I have discussed this analysis with Justice O'Connor's 
law clerk, since we had discussed the case several times previ-
ously, and he seems to agree that this approach resolves the ap-
parent inconsistency in the EPA's use of the term "source." 
On reflection, I would strongly oppose striking down the 
1§7501(3) defines the term "lowest achievable emission rate" as 
"that rate of emissions which reflects (A) the most stringent 
emission limitation which is contained in theimplementaiton of 
any State for such class or category of source ••. , or (B) the 
most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in practice 
by such class or category of source ••.. " 
- -
EPA regulations simply on the basis that EPA seems to use 
"source" in two inconsistent ways. The analysis I have described 
shows how complicated the problem is; and the problem was not 
briefed, or even mentioned, by any of the parties. 
2. Required Improvements in Air Quality. -- The "bubble" 
concept does not imply that no progress will be made in pollution 
abatement. States with nonattainment areas must adopt plans that 
"require ••. reasonable further progress ... " " §7502 (b) (3). The ~ 
term "reasonable further progress" means "annual incremental re-
ductions in emissions •.• which are sufficient .. to provide for 
attainment of the applicable •.. air quality standard" by the 
required statutory deadline. §7501(1). 
Other methods of pollution control are available to the 
states besides the "new source review" program, to which the 
"bubble" concept applies. In addition to control of new sources, 
states place controls upon existing sources. And control of ex-
isting sources may often be the more efficient means of reducing 
pollution. For example, the amount of sulfur dioxide that is 
emitted by coal generators can be controlled either by "scrub-
bers" or by using low sulfur coal. Requiring existing plants to 
use low sulfur coal may achieve the same amount of pollution 
abatement, and be much less costly, than requiring all new gener-
ators to be fitted with "scrubbers." 
Further, even with the "bubble" concept, the states ------ - --------
would be free to require new sources to adopt various method§ of 
----------~ - - - '-""" 
pollution control. The states merely will be free of any rigid 
- -
compulsion to require "state-of-the-art" technology -- technology 
that is required with little regard to cost-effectiveness. 
Thus, although adopting the "bubble" concept may reduce 
the number of instances in which plants will be required to in-
stall state-of-the-art technology, the states retain a number of 
means to improve air quality. 
-------------------.; 
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CHEVRON, U.S. A., INC., PETITIONER 
82-1005 V. 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., 
ET AL. 
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE, ET AL., 
- 2 u__ PETITIONERS 
~2-lI247 v. 
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v~ ~ I ~r:s --~ ( ~ . 
Z 6. - 2-, 7 WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS, ADMINISTRATOR, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
PETITIONER 
82-1591 v. 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., 
ETAL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1984] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
r;j:g 
( 
In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 
91 Stat. 685 et seq., Congress enacted certain requirements 
applicable to States that had not achieved the national air 
quality standards established by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency pursuant to earlier legislation. The amended / q 7 7 ~ 
Act required these "nonattainment" States to establish a per-
mit pro_gram regulating "new or modified major statioriary-
sources" of air pollution. Generally, a penmt may not be is-
sued for a new or modified major stationary source unless 
.• ... - -
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several stringent conditions are met. 1 The EPA regulation 
promulgated to implement this permit requirement allows a 
State to adopt a plant-wide definiti01rof the term "stationary 
source." 2 Unaer this definition, an existing plant that con-
~everal pollution-emitting devices may install or modify 
one piece of equipment without meeting the permit condi-
tions if the alteration will not increase the total emissions 
from the plant. ~e questfcm presentecf by this case is 
whetlierE15A's decision to allow States to treat all of the pol-
lution-emitting devices within the same industrial ou ing 
as though they were encased within a mgle "bubbl " is 
based on a reasonable construction of Uie . . . . 
"stationary source." 
I 
The EPA regulations containing the plant-wide definition 
of the term stationary source were promulgated on October 
14, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 50766. Respondents 3 filed a timely 
petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 42 U. S. C. 
§ 7607(b)(l). 4 The Court of Appeals set aside the regula-
'Section 172(b)(6) provides: 
"The plan provisions required by subsection (a) shall-
"(6) require permits for the construction and operation of new or modi-
fied major stationary sources in accordance with section 173 (relating to 
permit requirements) . . .. " 91 Stat. 747. 
2 "(i) 'Stationary source' means any building, structure, facility, or in-
stallation which emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation 
under the Act. 
"(ii) 'Building, structure, facility, or installation' means all of the pollut-
ant-emitting activities which belong to the same industrial grouping, are 
located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under 
the control of the same person (or persons under common control) except 
the activities of any vessel." 40 CFR § 51.18(j)(l)(i) and (ii). 
3 National Resources Defense Council, Inc., Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment, Inc. and North Western Ohio Lung Association, Inc. 
'Petitioners, Chevron U.S. A. Inc., American Iron and Steel Institute, 
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tions. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Gorsuch, 685 F. 2d 718 (1982). 
The court observed that the relevant part of the amended 
Clean Air Act "does not explicitly define what Congress envi-
sioned as a 'stationary source, to which the permit program 
... should apply," and further stated that the precise issue 
was not "squarely addressed in the legislative history." Id., 
at 723. In light of its conclusion that the legislative history 
bearing on the question was "at best contradictory," it rea-
soned that "the purposes of the nonattainment program 
should guide our decision here." Id., at 726 n. 39. 5 Based 
on two of its precedents concerning the applicability of the 
bubble concept to certain Clean Air Act programs, 6 the court 
stated that the bubble concept was "mandatory'' in programs 
designed merely to maintain existing air quality, but held 
that it was "inappropriate" in programs enacted to improve 
air quality. Id., at 726. Since the purpose of the permit 
program-its "raison d'etre," in the court's view-was to im-
prove air quality, the court held that the bubble concept was 
inapplicable in this case under its prior precedents. Ibid. 
It therefore set aside the regulations embodying the bubble 
concept as contrary to law. We granted certiorari to review 
that judgment, - - U. S. --, and we now reverse. 
The basic ~l ~2.!' of the Court ofAppealswas to adopt a 
static jiicncial defuntion of the term stationary source when it 
h~ngress it~anded that 
definition. Respondents do not defend the legal reasoning of 
General Motors Corporation, and Rubber Manufacturers Association were 
granted leave to intervene and argue in support of the regulation. 
5 The court remarked in this regard: 
''We regret, of course, that Congress did not advert specificially to the bub-
ble concept's application to various Clean Air Act programs, and note that 
a further clarifying statutory directive would facilitate the work of the 
agency and of the court in their endeavors to serve the legislators' will." 
685 F. 2d, at 726 n. 39. 
' Alabama Power Co. v. Castle, 636 F. 2d 323 (1979); ASARCO, Inc . v. 
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the Court of Appeals. 7 Nevertheless, since this Court re-
views judgments, not opinions, 8 we must determine whether 
the Court of Appeals' legal error resulted in an erroneous 
judgment on the validity of the regulations. 
II 
When a court reviews an agencfs construction of the stat-
ute which it administers, it is confrontea wftntwo questions. 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. 9 If, however, the court deter-
mines Congress has not directly addressed the precise ques-
7 Respondents argued below that that EPA's plant-wide definition of 
stationary source is contrary to the terms, legislative history, and pur-
poses of the amended Clear Air Act. The court below rejected respond-
ents' arguments based on the language and legislative history of the Act. 
It did agree with respondents contention that the regulations were incon-
sistent with the purposes of the Act, but did not adopt the construction of I 
the statute advanced by respondents here. Respondents rely on the argu-
ments rejected by the court of appeals in support of the judgment, and may 
rely on any ground that finds support in the record. See Ryerson v. 
United States, 312 U. S. 405, 408 (1941); LeTu lle v. Scofield, 308 U. S. 415, 
421 (1940); Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 533-539 (1931). 
8 E. g., Black v. Cutter Laboratories , 351 U. S. 292, 297 (1956); Riley 
Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U. S. 55, 59 (1940); Williams v. Norris, 12 
Wheat. 117, 120 (1827); M'Clung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598, 603 (1821). 
9 The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction 
and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear 
congressional intent. See, e. g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Cam-
pai,gn Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 32 (1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 
117-118 (1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 745-746 
(1973); Volkswagenwerk v. FMC , 390 U. S. 261, 272 (1968); NLRB v. 
Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 291 (1965); FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co ., 380 U. S. 
374, 385 (1965); Social Security Board v. Nieratko, 327 U. S. 358, 369 
(1946); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, 16 (1932); Webster v. 
Luther, 163 U. S. 331, 342 (1896). If a court, employing traditional tools 
of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the 
precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect . 
- -
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tion at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, 10 as would be necessary in the 
absense of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's an-
swer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 11 
"The power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires 
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap 
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Morton v. Ruiz, 
415 U. S. 199, 231 (1974). If Congress has explicitly left a 
gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are 
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 12 Sometimes the 
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is 
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provison for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency. 13 
10 See generally, R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 174-175 
(1921). 
11 The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only 
one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even 
the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen 
in a judicial proceeding. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Com-
mittee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 
U. S. 443, 450 (1978); Train v. NRDC, 421 U. S. 60, 75 (1975); Udall v. 
Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n 
v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153 (1946); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U. S. 477, 
480-481 (1921). 
12 See, e.g., United States V. Morton, -- u. s. -- , -----
(1984) (slip op. at 11-12); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 44 
(1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424-26 (1977); American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 235-237 (1936). 
13 E.g., INS v. Wang, 450 U. S. 139, 144 (1981); Train v. NRDC, 421 
u. s. 60, 87 (1975). 
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"has been consistently--fel-Jm£_ed by this Co~enever 
decision as to the meaning orreacfiofastatute has in-
volved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full under-
standing of the force of the statutory policy in the given 
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowl-
edge respecting the matters subjected to agency regula-
tions. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United 
States, 319 U. S. 190; Labor Board v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., 322 U. S. 111; Republic Aviation Corp. v. 
Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793; Securities & Exchange 
Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 322 U. S. 194; Labor Board 
v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344 ..... If this 
choice represents a reasonable accommodation of con-
flicting policies that were committed to the agency's care 
by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears 
from the statute or its legislative history that the accom-
modation is not one that Congress would have sanc-
tioned." United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 382, 
383 (1961). Accord Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 
- U.S.-, - - - (1984) (slip op. at 6-7). 
I.n light of these well-settled principles it is clear that the 
Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in re-
uAluminum Co. v. Central Lincoln Util. Dist., -- U.S.--, --
(1984) (slip op. at 8); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 141 (1982); Union 
Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976); Investment Company In-
stitute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971); Unemployment Commis-
sion v. Aragaon, 329 U. S. 143, 153-154 (1946); NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, 322 U. S. 111, 131 (1944); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U. S. 477, 
480-481 (1921); Webster v. Luther, 163 U. S. 331, 342 (1896); Brown v. 
United States, 113 U. S. 568 U. S. 568, 570-571 (1885); United States v. 
Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1877); Edwards v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 
(1827). 
- -
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viewing the regulations at issue. Once it determined, after 
its own examination of the legislation, that Congress did not 
actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the bub-
ble concept to the permit program, the question before it was 
not whether in its view the concept is "inappropriate" in the 
general context of a program designed to improve air quality, 
but whether the Administrator's view that it is appropriate 
in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one. 
Based on the examination of the legislation and its history 
wrnch follows, we a gree witiillie C"'otiftoI Ap1feals t liat C-on-
gresso[d not have a specific7ntention"on the applicaollity of 
the ubble concept mt s case, an cone u e a t e A's 
~ e~e ~ are~ e 
,...,_ 
III 
In the 1950's and the 1960's Congress enacted a series of 
statutes designed to encourage and to assist the States in 
curtailing air pollution. See generally Train v. Natural Re-
s<YUrces Defense C<YUncil, 421 U. S. 60, 63-64 (1975). The 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 
1676, "sharply increased federal authority and responsibility 
in the continuing effort to combat air pollution," id., at 64, 
but continued to assign "primary responsibility for assuring 
air quality'' to the several States, 84 Stat. 1678. Section 109 
of the 1970 Amendments directed the EPA to promulgate 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS's) 15 and 
§ 110 directed the States to develop plans (SIP's) to imple-
ment the standards within specified deadlines. In addition, 
§ 111 provided that major new sources of pollution would be 
required to conform to technology-based performance stand-
ards; the EPA was directed to publish a list of categories of 
sources of pollution and to establish new source performance 
1
• Primary standards were defined as those whose attainment and main-
tenance were necessary to protect the public health and secondary stand-
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standards (NSPS) for each. Section lll(e) prohibited the 
operation of any new source in violation of a performance 
standard. 
Section lll(a) defined the terms that are to be used in set-
ting and enforcing standards of performance for new station-
ary sources. It provided: 
"For purposes of this section: 
"(3) The term 'stationary source' means any building, 
structure, facility, or installation which emits or may 
emit any air pollutant." 84 Stat. at 1683. 
In the 1970 Act, that definition was not only applicable to the 
NSPS program required by § 111, but also was made appli-
cable to a requirement of§ 110 that each state implementa-
tion plan contain a procedure for reviewing the location of 
any proposed new source and preventing its construction if it 
would preclude the attainment or maintenance of national air 
quality standards. 16 
In due course, the EPA promulgated NAAQS's, approved 
SIP's, and adopted detailed regulations governing NSPS's 
for various categories of equipment. In one of its programs, 
the EPA used a plant-wide definition of the term "stationary 
source. n , 1t issue P 's for the nonferrous smelt-
ing industry that provided that the standards would not 
apply to the modification of major smelting units if their in-
creased emissions were offset by reductions in other portions 
of the same plant. 11 
16 See §§ 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(a)(4). 
11 The Court of Appeals ultimately held that this plant-wide approach was 
prohibited by the 1970 Act, see ASARCO, INC., su-pra, 578 F . 2d, at 
325-327. This decision was rendered after enactment of the 1977 amend-
ments, and hence the standard was in effect when Congress enacted the 
1977 Amendments. 
- -
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onattain 
Tnet970Tegislation provided for the attainment of primary 
NAJ\QS's by 1~ In ma areas o the coun ry, particu-
larly the most md'ustrialized States, the statutory goals were 
not attained. 18 In 1976, the 94th Congress was confronted 
with this fundamental problem, as well as many others re-
specting pollution control. As always in this area, the legis-
lative struggle was basically between interests seeking strict 
schemes to reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its social 
costs and interests advancing the economic concern that 
strict schemes would retard industrial development with at-
tendant social costs. The 94th Congress, confronting these 
competing interests, was unable to agree on what response 
was in the public interest: legislative proposals to deal with 
nonattainment failed to command the necessary consensus. 19 
In light of this situation, the EPA published an Emissions \ 
Offset Interpretative Ruling in December 1976, see 41 Fed. 
Reg. 55524, to "fill the gap," as respondents put it, until Con-
gress acted. The Ruling stated that it was intended to ad-
dress "the issue of whether and to what extent national air 
quality standards established under the Clean Air Act may 
restrict or prohibit growth of major new or expanded station-
ary air pollution sources." App. 8. In general, the ruling 
provided "that a major new source may locate in an area with 
air quality worse than a national standard only if stringent 
conditions can be met." Ibid. The Ruling gave primary 
emphasis to the rapid attainment of the statute's environ-
mental goals. 20 Consistent with that emphasis, the construe-
18 See Report of the National Commission on Air Quality, at 3. 3-20 thru 
3.3-33. 
19 Comprehensive bills did pass both chambers of Congress; the confer-
ence report was rejected in the Senate. 5 Leg. Hist., at 4411-4500. 
20 For example, it stated: 
"Particularly with regard to the primary NAAQS's, Congress and the 
Courts have made clear that economic considerations must be subordinated 
to NAAQS achievement and maintenance. While the ruling allows for 
some growth in areas violating a NAAQS if the net effect is to insure fur-
r- ! 
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tion of every new source in nonattainment areas had to meet 
the "lowest achievable emission rate" under the current state 
of the art for that type of facility. See App. 12. The 1976 
Ruling did not, however, explicitly adopt or reject the "bub-
ble concept." 21 
IV 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 are a lengthy, de-
tailed, techriical:Complex, ancfcomprehensive response to a 
major social issue. A ~ atute-91 Stat. 
745-51 (Part D of Title I of the amended Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 7501-7508)-expressly deals with nonattainment areas. 
The focal point o this controversy 1s one phrase in t at por-
tion of the Amendments. 22 
Basically, the statute required each State in a 
nonattainment area to prepare and obtain approval of a new 
SIP by July 1, 1979. In the interim those States were re-
quired to comply with the EP A's interpretative Ruling of De-
cember 21, 1976. 91 Stat. 745. The deadline for attainment 
of the primary NAAQS's was extended until December 31, 
ther progress toward NAAQS achievement, the Act does not allow eco-
nomic growth to be accommodated at the expense of the public health." 
App. 18. 
21 In January 1979, the EPA noted that the 1976 Ruling was ambiguous 
concerning this issue: 
"A number of commenters indicated the need for a more explicit defini-
tion of 'source.' Some readers found that it was unclear under the 1976 
Ruling whether a plant with a number of different processes and emission 
points would be considered a single source. The changes set forth below 
define a source as 'any structure, building, facility, equipment, installation, 
or operation (or combination thereof) which is located on one or more 
contiguous or adjacent properties and which is owned or operated by the 
same person (or by persons under common control. ' This definition pre-
cludes a large plant from being separated into individual production lines 
for purposes of determining applicability of the offset requirements. " 
App. 42 
22 Specifically, the controversy in this case involves the meaning of the I 
term "major stationary sources" in § 172(b)(6) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 7502(b)(6). The meaning of the term "proposed source" in § 173(2) of the 
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7503(2), is not at issue. 
/977 
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1982, and in some cases until December 31, 1987, but the 
SIP's were required to contain a number of provisions de-
signed to achieve the goals as expeditiously as possible. 23 
Most significantly for our purposes, the statute provided 
that each p an s a : 
"(6) re@ire permits for the construction and opera-
tion of Hew or modified ma· or station sources m ac-
cordance WI sect10n 173 .... " 91 Stat. 747. 
Before issuing a permit, § 173 requires the state agency to 
determine that (1) there wiir'be sufficient emissions reduc-
tions in the region to offset the .... emissions from the new 
source and also to allow for reasona61e further progress to-
ward attainment, or that the increased emissions will not ex-
28 Thus, among other requirements, § 172(b) provided that the SIP's 
shall-
"(3) require, in the interim, reasonable further progress (as defined in 
section 171(1)) including such reduction in emissions from existing sources 
in the area as may be obtained through the adoption, at a minimum, of rea-
sonably available control technology; 
"(4) include a comprehensive, accurate, current inventory of actual 
emissions from all sources (as provided by rule of the Administrator) of 
each such pollutant for each such area which is revised and resubmitted as 
frequently as may be necessary to assure that the requirements of para-
graph (3) are met and to assess the need for additonal reductions to assure 
attainment of each standard by the date required under paragraph (1); 
"(5) expressly identify and quantify the emissions, if any, of any such 
pollutant which will be allowed to result from the construction and opera-
tion of major new or modified stationary sources for each such area; . . . 
"(8) contain emission limitations, schedules of compliance and such other 
measures as may be necessary to meet the requirements of this section. 
. . . " 91 Stat. 747. 
Section 171(1) provided: 
"(1) The term 'reasonable further progress' means annual incremental 
reductions in emissions of the applicable air pollutant (including substantial 
reductions in the early years following approval or promulgation of plan 
provisions under this part and section 110(a)(2)(I) and regular reductions 
thereafter) which are sufficient in the judgment of the Administrator, to 
provide for attainment of the applicable national ambient air quality stand-
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ceed an allowance for growth established pursuant to 
§ 172(b)(5); (2) the applicant must certify that his other 
sources in the State are in compliance with the SIP, (3) the 
agency must determine that the applicable SIP is otherwise 
being implemented, and (4) the proposed source complies 
with the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER). 24 
The 1977 Amendments contain no specific reference to the 
"b~ t. or o t ey contain a specific e "tion 
of the term "stationary source," though they did not disturb 
the definition of "stationary source" contained in § lll(a)(3), 
applicable by the terms of the Act to the NSPS program. 
Section 302(j), however, defines the term "major stationary 
source" as follows: 
"(j) Except as otherwise expressly provided, the 
terms 'major stationary source' and 'major emitting facil-
ity' mean anJ'.: stationary fac!!!,ty gr s~ of air pollut-




one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant 
(including any major emitting facility or source of fugi- ~ - ? 
tive emissions of any such pollutant, as determined by ' 
rule by the Administrator)." 91 Stat. 770. 
24 Section 171(3) provides: 
"(3) The term 'lowest achievable emission rate' means for any source, 
that rate of emissions which reflects-
"(A) the most stringent emission limitations which is contained in the 
implementation plan of any State for such class or category of source, un-
less the owner or operator of the proposed source demonstrates that such 
limitations are not achievable, or 
"(B) the most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in practice 
by such class or category of source, whichever is more stringent. 
"In no event shall the application of this term permit a proposed new or 
modified source to emit any pollutant in excess of the amount allowable 
under applicable new source standards of performance." Id., at 746. 
The LAER requirement is defined in terms that make it even more 
stringent than the applicable new source performance standard developed 
under § 111 of the 1970 statute. 
r 
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V 
The legislative history of the portion of the 1977 Amend-
ments dealing with nonattainment areas does not contain any 
specific comment on the "bubble concept" or the question 
whether a plant-wide definition of a stationary source is per-
missible under the permit program. It does, ~ver, 
plainly disclose that in the permit program Congress sought 
to accommodate the conflict between the econo:mlc mterest in 
pernuttmg capital improvements to contmue ana the environ-
mental mteresfinmiproving air uality. , Indeecf, tneHouse 
Commit ee eport 1 enti ed the economic interest as one of 
the "two main purposes" of this section of the bill. It stated: 
"Section 117 of the bill, adopted during full committee 
markup establishes a new section 127 to the Clean Air 
Act. The section has two main purposes: (1) to allow 
reasonable economic growth to continue in an area while 
making reasonable further progress to assure attain-
ment of the standards by a fixed date; and (2) to allow 
States greater flexibility for the former purpose than 
EP A's present interpretative regulations afford. 
"The new provision allows States with nonattainment 
areas to pursue one of two options. First, the State 
may proceed under EP A's present 'tradeoff' or 'offset' 
ruling. The Administrator is authorized, moreover, to 
modify or amend that ruling in accordance with the in-
tent and purposes of this section. 
"The State's second option would be to revise its im-
plementation plan in accordance with this new provi-
sion." H. R. Rep. 564, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 211 
(1977). 25 
25 During the floor debates Congressman Waxman remarked that the leg-
islation struck 
"a proper balance between environmental controls and economic growth in 
the dirty air areas of America. *** There is no other single issue which 
more clearly poses the conflict between pollution control and new jobs. 
We have determined that neither need be compromised. *** 
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The portion of the Senate Committe Report dealing with 
nonattainment areas states generally that it was intended to 
"supersede the EPA administrative approach," and that ex-
pansion should be permitted if a State could "demonstrate 
that these facilities can be accommodated within its overall 
plan to provide for attainment of air quality standards." S. 
Rep. 127, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1429 (1977). The Senate Re-
port notes the value of "case-by-case review of each new or 
modified major source of pollution that seeks to locate in a re-
gion exceeding an ambient standard," explaining that such a 
review "requires matching reductions from existing sources 
against emissions expected from the new source in order to 
assure that introduction of the new source will not prevent 
attainment of the applicable standard by the statutory dead-
line." Ibid. This description of a case-by-case approach to 
plant additions, which emphasizes the net consequences of 
the construction or modification of a new source, as well as its 
impact on the overall achievement of the national standards, 
was not, however, addressed to the precise issue raised by 
this case. 
Senator Muskie made the following remarks: 
"I should note that the test for determining whether a 
new or modified source is subject to the EPA interpreta-
tive regulation [the Offset Ruling]-and to the permit re-
quirements of the revised implementation plans under 
the conference bill-is whether the source will emit a 
pollutant into an area which is exceeding a national ambi-
ent air quality standard for that pollutant-or precursor. 
"This is a fair and balanced approach, which will not undermine our eco-
nomic vitality, or impede achievement of our ultimate environmental objec-
tives. " 123 Cong. Rec. 27076 (1977). 
The second "main purpose" of the provison-allowing the States 
"greater flexibility'' than the EP A's interpretative ruling-as well as the 
reference to the EP A's authority to amend its ruling in accordance with the 
intent of the section, is entirely consistent with the view that Congress did 
not intend to freeze the definition of source contained in the existing regu-
lation into a rigid statutory requirement. 
- -
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Thus, a new source is still subject to such requirements 
as 'lowest achievable emission rate' even if it is used as a 
re2lacement for an older facility resulting in a net reduc-
tion from previous emission levels. 
"A scrurce=includi-ng=-aii=exi-sting facility ordered to 
convert to coal-is subject to all the nonattainment re-
quirements as a modified source if it makes any physical 
change which increases the amount of any air pollutant 
for the the standards in the area are exceeded." 123 
Cong. Rec. 26846 (1977). 
VI 
As previously noted, prior to the 1977 Amendments, the 
EPA had adhered to a plant-wide definition of the term 
"source" under a NSPS program. After adoption of the 1977 
Amendments, proposals for a plant-wide definition were con-
sidered in at least three formal proceedings. 
In January, 1979, the EPA considered the question 
whether the same restriction on new construction in 
nonattaiment areas that had been included in its December 
1976 ruling should be required in the revised SIPs that were 
scheduled to go into effect in July 1979. After noting that 
the 1976 ruling was ambiguous on the question "whether a 
plant with a number of different processes and emission 
points would be considered a single source," app. 42, the 
EPA, in effect, provided a bifurcated answer to that ques-
tion. In those areas that did not have a revised SIP in effect 
by July 1979, the EPA rejected the plant-wide definition; on 
the other hand, it expressly concluded that the plant-wide ap-
proach would be permissible in certain circumstances if au-
thorized by an approved SIP. It stated: 
"Where a state implementation plan is revised and im-
plemented to satisfy the requirements of Part D, includ-
ing the reasonable further progress requirement, the 
plan requirements for major modifications may exempt 
modifications of existing facilities that are accompanied 
by intrasource offsets so that there is no net increase in 
- -
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ermss1ons. The agency endorses such exemptions, 
which would provide greater flexibility to sources to ef-
fectively manage their air emissions at least cost." 
App. 43. 26 
In April, and again in September, 1979, the EPA published 
additional comments in which it indicated that revised SIPs 
could adopt the plant-wide definition of source in 
nonattainment areas in certain circumstances. See 44 Fed. 
Reg. 20372, 20379, 51951, 51924, 51958. On the latter occa-
sion, the EPA m~ a formal rulemak:ing .e,roposal that wo~ld 
have permitte~ use of the "bubble concept'' for new m-
stallations within a plant as well as for modifications of exist-
ing units~ 
"' ubble' Exemptio'Kr.)The use of offsets inside the 
same~ 'bubble.' EPA proposes use of 
the definition of 'source' (see above) to limit the use of 
the bubble under nonattainment requirements in the fol-
lowing respects: 
"i. Part D SIPs that include all requirements needed 
to assure reasonable further progress and attainment by 
the deadline under section 172 and that are being carried 
26 In the same ruling, the EPA added: 
"The above exemption is permitted under the SIP because, to be approved 
under Part D, plan revisions due by January 1979 must contain adopted 
measures assuring that reasonable further progress will be made. Fur-
thermore, in most circumstances, the measures adopted by January 1979 
must be sufficient to actually provide for attainment of the standards by 
the dates required under the Act, and in all circumstances measures 
adopted by 1982 must provide for attainment. See Section 172 of the Act 
and 43 Fed. Reg. 21673-21677 (May 19, 1978). Also, Congress intended 
under Section 173 of the Act that States would have some latitude to de-
part from the strict requirements of this Ruling when the State plan is re-
vised and is being carried out in accordance with Part D. Under a Part D 
plan, therefore, there is less need to subject a modification of an existing 
facility to LAER and other stringent requirements if the modification is 
accompanied by sufficient intrasource offsets so that there is no net in-
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out need not restrict the use of a plantwide bubble, the 
same as under the PSD proposal. 
"ii. Part D SIPs that do not meet the requirements 
specified must limit use of the bubble by including a defi-
nition of 'installation' as an identifiable piece of process 
equipment." 27 
Significantly, the EPA expressly noted that the word 
"source" might be given a plant-wide definition for some pur-
poses and a narrower definition for other purposes. It 
wrote: 
"Source means any building structure, facility, or instal-
lation which emits or may emit any regulated pollutant. 
'Building, structure, facility or installation' means plant 
in PSD areas and in nonattainment areas except where 
the growth prohibitions would apply or where no ade-
quate SIP exists or is being carried out." App. 54. 28 
The EP A's summary of its proposed ruling discloses a flexi-
ble rather than rigid definition of the term "source" to imple-
ment various policies and programs: 
-rr App. 56. Later in that ruling, the EPA added: 
"However, EPA believes that complete Part D SIPs, which contain 
adopted and enforceable requirements sufficient to assure attainment, may 
apply the approach proposed above for PSD, with plant-wide review but no 
review of individual pieces of equipment. Use of only a plant-wide defini-
tion of source will permit plant-wide offsets for avoiding NSR of new or 
modified pieces of equipment. However, this is only appropriate once a 
SIP is adopted that will assure the reductions in existing emissions neces-
sary for attainment. See 44 FR 3276 col. 3 (January 16, 1979). If the 
level of emissions allowed in the SIP is low enough to assure reasonable 
further progress and attainment, new contruction or modifications with 
enough offset credit to prevent an emission increase should not jeopardize 
attainment." App. 66. 
28 In its explanation of why the use of the bubble concept was especially 
appropriate in preventing significant deterioration (PSD) in clean air areas, 
the EPA stated: "In addition, application of the bubble on a plant-wide 
basis encourages voluntary upgrading of equipment, and growth in produc-
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"In summary, EPA is proposing two different ways to 
define source for different kinds of NSR programs: 
"(1) For PSD and complete Part D SIPs, review 
would apply only to plants, with an unrestricted plant-
wide bubble. 
"(2) For the offset ruling, restrictions on construction, 
and incomplete Part D SIPs, review would apply to both 
plants and individual pieces of process equipment, caus-
ing the plant-wide bubble not to apply for new and modi-
fied major pieces of equipment. 
"In addition, for the restrictions on construction, EPA 
is proposing to define 'major modification' so as to pro-
hibit the bubble entirely. Finally, an alternative dis-
cussed but not favored is to have only pieces of process 
equipment reviewed, resulting in a no plant-wide bubble 
and allowing minor pieces of equipment to escape NSR 
regardless of whether they are within a major plant." 
J. A. 67. 
In August of 1980, however, the EPA adopted a regulation ~ 
that, in essence, applied the basic reasoning of the Court of 
Appeals in this case. The EPA took particular note of the 
two then recent Court of Appeals decisions, which had cre-
ated the bright-line rule that the bubble concept should be 
employed in a program designed to maintain air quality but 
not in one designed to enhance air quality. Relying heavily 
on those cases, 29 EPA adopted a dual definition of "source" 
29 "The dual definition also is consistent with Alabama Power and 
ASARCO. Alabama Power held that EPA had broad discretion to define 
the constituent terms of 'source' so as best to effectuate the purposes of the 
statute. Different definitions of 'source' can therefore be used for differ-
ent sections of the statute. *** 
"Moreover, Alabama Power and ASARCO taken together suggest that 
there is a distinction between Clean Air Act programs designed to enhance 
air quality and those designed only to maintain air quality. *** 
"Promulgation of the dual definition follows the mandate of Alabama 
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for nonattainment areas that required a permit whenever a 
change in either the entire plant, or one of its components, 
would result in a significant increase in emissions even if the 
increase was completely offset by reductions elsewhere in the 
plant. The EPA expressed the opinion that this interpreta-
tion was "more consistent with congressional intent" than the 
plant-wide definition because it "would bring in more sources 
or modifications for review" app. 82, but its primary legal 
analysis was predicated on the two Court of Appeals 
decisions. 
In 1981 a new Administration took office and initiated a 
"Government-wide reexamination or regulatory burdens and 
complexities." App. 93. In the context of that review, the 
EPA reevaluated the various arguments that had been ad-
vanced in connection with the proper definition of the term 
"source" and concluded that the term should be given the I / q P/ 
same definition m o nona ammen areas and PSD areas. 
in explainmg its conclusion, the EPA first noted that'the 
definitional issue was not squarely addressed in either the 
statute or its legislative history and therefore that the issue 
involved an agency "judgment as to how best to carry out the ~ 
Act." Ibid. It then set forth several reasons for concluding / _ -c 
that the plant-wide definition was more appropriate. It ~A,1--'_;,A.,,_fa 
pointed out that the dual definition "can act as a disincentive ti/ - --7 ,-~ v-r 
to new investment and modernization by discouraging modifi-
cations to existing facilities" and "can actually retard 
progress in air pollution control by discouraging replacement 
of older, dirtier processes or pieces of equipment with new, 
cleaner ones." App. 94. Moreover, the new definition 
"would simplify EP A's rules by using the same definition of 
'source' for PSD, nonattainment new source review and the 
construction moratorium. This reduces confusion and incon-
sistency." Ibid. Finally, the agency explained that addi-
tional requirements that remained in place would accomplish 
ing,' 'structure,' 'facility,' and 'installation' so as to best accomplish the pur-
poses of the Act." App. 82-83. 
- -
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the fund~ental purposes of achieving a!!,ainment with 
NAAQS.., as exped1t10usly as po~ These conclusions 
were expresed in a proposed rulemaking in August 1981 that 
was formally promulgated in October. See 46 Fed. Reg. 
50766. 
VII 
In this Court respondents expressly reject the basic ration-~ 
ale of the Court of Appeals' decision. That court viewed 
the statutory definition of the term "source" as sufficiently ~~ 
flexible to cover either a plant-wide definition, a narrower 
definition covering each unit within a plant, or a dual defini-
tion that could apply to both the entire "bubble" and its com-
ponents. It interpreted the policies of the statute, however, 
to mandate the plant-wide definition in programs designed to 
maintain clean air and to forbid it in programs designed to im-
prove air quality. Respondents place a fundamentally dif-
ferent construction on the statute. ey con end t a e 
text o e Act requires e to use a dual definition-if 
either a component of a plant, or the plant as a whole, emits 
over 100 tons of pollutant, it is a major stationary source. 
They thus contend that the EPA rules adopted in 1980, inso-
far as they apply to the maintenance of the quality of clean 
30 It stated: 
"5. States will remain subject to the requirement that for all 
nonattainment areas they demonstrate attainment of NAAQS as expe-
ditiously as practicable and show reasonable further progress toward such 
attainment. Thus, the proposed change in the mandatory scope of 
nonattainment new source review should not interfere with the funda-
mental purpose of Part D of the Act. 
"6. New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) will continue to apply 
to many new or modified facilities and will assure use of the most up-to-
date pollution control techniques regardless of the applicability of 
nonattainment area new source review. 
"7. In order to avoid nonattainment area new source review, a major 
plant undergoing modification must show that it will not experience a sig-
nificant net increase in emissions. Where overall emissions increas signifi-
cantly, review will continue to be required." App. 94. 
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air, as well as the 1981 rules which apply to nonattainment 
areas, violate the statute. 31 
Statutory Language 
The definition of the term stationary source in § lll(a)(3) 
refers to "any building, structure, facility, or installation" 
which emits air pollution. See supra, at 8. This definition 
is applicable only to the NSPS program by the express terms 
of the statute; the text of the statute does not make this defi-
nition applicable to the permit program. Petitioners there-
fore maintain that there is no statutory language even rele-
vant to ascertaining the meaning of stationary source in the 
permit program aside from § 302(j), which defines the term 
major stationary source. See supra, at 12. We disagree 
with petitioners on this point. V\ 
The definition in § 302(j) tells us what the word "major" 
means-a source must emit at least 100 tons of pollution to 
qualify-but it sheds virtually no light on the meaning of the 
term "stationary source." It does equate a source with a fa-
cility-a "major emitting facility" and a "major stationary 
source" are synonymous under § 302(j). The ordinary mean-
ing of the term facility is some collection of integrated ele-
ments which has been designed and constructed to achieve 
some purpose. Moreover, it is certainly no affront to com-
mon English usage to take a reference to a major facility or a 
major source to connote an entire plant as opposed to its con-
stituent parts. Basically, however, the language of§ 302(j) 
simply does not compel any given interpretation of the term 
source. 
Respondents recognize that, and hence point to § lll(a)(3). 
Although the definition in that section is not literally appli-
cable to the permit program, it sheds as much light on the 
31 ''What EPA may not do, however, is define all four terms to mean only 
plants. In the 1980 PSD rules, EPA did just that. EPA compounded the 
mistake in the 1981 rules here under review, in which it abandoned the 
dual definition." Br. for Respondents 29 n. 55. 
- -
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meaning of the word source as anything in the statute. 32 As 
respondents point out, use of the words "building, structure, 
facility, or installation," as the definition of source, could be 
read to impose the permit conditions on an individual building 
that is a part of a plant. 3.3 A "word may have a character of 
its own not to be submerged by its association." Russell 
Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 514, 519 (1923). 
On the other hand, the meaning of a word must be ascer-
tained in the context of achieving particular objectives, and 
the words associated with it may indicate that the true mean-
ing of the series is to convey a common idea. The language 
may reasonably be interpreted to impose the requirement on 
any discrete, but integrated, operation which pollutes. This 
gives meaning to all of the terms-a single building, not 
part of a larger operation, would be covered if it emits more 
than 100 tons of pollution, as would any facility, structure, or 
installation. Indeed, the language itself implies a bubble 
concept of sorts: each enumerated item would seem to be 
treated as if it were encased in a bubble. While respond-
ents insist that each of these terms must be given a discrete 
meaning, they also argue that § lll(a)(3) defines "source" as 
that term is used in § 302(j). The latter section, however, 
equates a source with a facility, whereas the former defines 
source as a facility, among other items. 
We are not pers_uaded that parsing of general terms in the I 
text of the statute~ ll reveal an actual intent of Congress. 34 
32 We note that the EPA in fact adopted the language of that definition in 
its regulations under the permit program. 40 CFR § 51.18(j)(l)(i)-(ii). 
33 Since the regulations give the States the option to define an individual 
unit as a source, see 40 CFR § 51.18(j)(l), petitioners do not dispute that 
the terms can be read as respondents suggest. 
34 The argument based on the text of § 173, which defines the permit re-
quirements for nonattainment areas, is a classic example of circular reason-
ing. One of the permit requirements is that "the proposed source is re-
quired to comply with the lowest achievable emission rate" (LAER). 
Although a State may submit a revised SIP that provides for the waiver of 
another requirement-the "offset condition"-the SIP may not provide for 
- -
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We know full well that this language is not dispositive; the 
terms are overlapping and the language is not precisely di-
rected to the question of the applicability of a given term in 
the context of a larger operation. To the extent any con-
gressional "~t" can be discerned from this language~ , 
wo~that the listing of overlapping, illustrative 
terms was intended to enlarge, rather than to confine, the 
scope of the agency's power to regulate particular sources in 
order to effectuate the policies of the Act. 
Legislative History 
In addition, respondents argue that the legislative history 
and policies of the Act foreclose the plant-wide definition, and 
that the EPA's interpretation is not entitled to deference be-
cause it represents a sharp break with prior interpretations 
of the Act. 
Based on our examination of the legislative history, we 
agree with the court of appeals that it is unilluminating. The 
general remarks pointed to by respondents "were obviously 
not made with this narrow issue in mind and they cannot be 
said to illustrate a Congressional desire. . .. " Jewel Ridge 
Corp. v. Local, 325 U. S. 161, 168-169 (1944). Respondent's 
argument based on the legislative history relies heavily on 
Senator Muskie's observation that a new source is subject to 
a waiver of the LAER condition for any proposed source. Respondents 
argue that the plant-wide definition of the term "source" makes it unnec-
essary for newly constructed units within the plant to satisfy the LAER 
requirement if their emissions are offset by the reductions achieved by the 
retirement of older equipment. Thus, according to respondents, the 
plant-wide definition allows what the statute explicitly prohibits-the 
waiver of the LAER requirement for the newly constructed units. But 
this argument proves nothing because the statute does not prohibit the 
waiver unless the proposed new unit is indeed subject to the permit pro-
gram. If it is not, the statute does not impose the LAER requirement at 
all and there is no need to reach any waiver question. In other words, 
§ 173 of the statute merely deals with the consequences of the definition of 
the term "source" and does not define the term. 
- -
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the LAER requirement. 35 But the full statement is ambigu-
ous and like the text of § 173 itself, this comment does not tell 
us what a new source is, much less that it is to have an inflex-
ible definition. We find that the legislative history as a 
whole is silent on the precise issue before us. It is, however, 
consistent with the view that the EPA should have broad dis-
cretion in implementing the policies of the 1977 Amendments. 
More importantly, that history plainly identifies the policy 
concerns that motivated the enactment; the plant-wide defi-
nition is fully consistent with one of those concerns-the al-
lowance of reasonable economic growth- and, whether or not 
we believe it most effectively implements the other, we must 
recognize that the EPA has advanced a reasonable explana-
tion for its conclusion that the regulations serve the environ-
mental objectives as well. See supra, at 19-20 and n. 29; see 
also 17 n. 27. Indeed, its reasoning is supported by the pub-
lic record developed in the rulemaking process, 36 as well as by 
certain private studies. 37 
Our review of the EP A's varying inter_pretations of the 
word "source"- both before anda rter~ 77 Apiend-
ments-convince us that the agency primaril res onsib for 
adnnnistering this importan egis a 10n has consistently in-
36 See supra, at --. We note that Senator Muskie was not critical of 
the EP A's use of the bubble concept in one NSPS program prior to the 
1977 amendments. See supra, at --. 
36 See, for example, the statement of the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation, pointing out that denying a source owner 
flexibility in selecting options made it "simpler and cheaper to operate old, 
more polluting sources than to trade up . . .. " App. 128-129. 
37 "Economists have proposed that economic incentives be substituted for 
the cumbersome administrative-legal framework. The objective is to 
make the profit and cost incentives that work so well in the marketplace 
work for pollution control. *** [The 'bubble' or 'netting' concept] is a first 
attempt in this direction. By giving a plant manager flexibility to find the 
places and processes within a plant that control emissions most cheaply, 
pollution control can be achieved more quickly and cheaply." L. Lave & 
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ter~xibly-not in a s~uum, but in 
the context of implementmg policy decisions in a technical 
and complex arena. The fact that the agency has from time 
to time changed its interpretation of the term source does 
not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no defer-
ence should be accorded the agency's interpretation of the 
statute. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly 
carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in 
informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations, 
and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. More-
over, the fact that the agency has adopted different defini-
tions in different contexts adds force to the argument that 
the definition itself is flexible, particularly since Congress has 
never indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the 
statute. 
Significantly, it was not the agency in 1980, but rather the 
Court of Appeals that read the statute inflexibly to command 
a plant-wide definition for programs designed to maintain 
clean air and to forbid such a definition for programs de-
signed to improve air quality. The distinction the court 
drew may well be a sensible one, but our labored review of 
the problem has surely disclosed that it is not a distinction 
that Congress ever articulated itself, or one that the EPA 
found in the statute before the courts began to review the 
legislative work product. We conclude that it was the Court 
of Appeals, rather than Congress or any of the 
decisionmakers who are authorized by Congress to adminis-
ter this legislation, that was primarily responsible for the 
1980 position taken by the agency. 
Policy 
The arguments over policy that are advanced in the par-
ties' briefs create the impression that respondents are now 
waging in a judicial forum a specific policy battle which they 
ultimately lost in the agency and in the thirty-two jurisdic-
tions opting for the bubble concept, but one which was never 
\ 
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waged in the Congress. Such policy arguments are more 
properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to 
judges.38 
In this case, the Administrator's interpretation represents 
a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing inter-
ests~ erence: the regulatory scheme is 
technical and complex, 39 the agency considered the matter 
in a detailed and reasoned fashion, 40 and the decision involves 
reconciling conflicting policies. 41 Congress intended to ac-
commodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level 
of specificity presented by this case. Perhaps that body con-
sciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at 
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and 
charged with responsibility for admininstering the provision 
would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did 
not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress 
was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, 
and those on each side decided to take their chances with the 
scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it 
matters not which of these things occurred. ~ 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of 
either political branch of the government. Courts must, in 
38 Respondents point out if a brand new factory that will emit over 100 
tons of pollutants is constructed in a nonattainment area, that plant must 
obtain a permit pursuant to§ 172(b)(6) and in order to do so, it must satisfy 
the § 173 conditions, including the LAER requirement. Respondents 
argue if an old plant containing several large emitting units is to be mod-
ernized by the replacement of one or more units emitting over 100 tons of 
pollutant with a new unit emitting less-but still more than 100 tons-the 
result should be no different simply because "it happens to be built not at a 
new site, but within a pre-existing plant." Br. 4. 
39 See e.g., Aluminun Co. v. Central Lincoln Util. Dist. , - U. S. 
- , - (1984) (slip op. at 8). 
'° See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117 (1978); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. 
United States, 434 U. S. 275, 287 n. 5 (1978); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
u. s. 134, 140 (1944). 
•
1 See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, - U. S. - , - - -
(1984) (slip op., at 6-7); United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 382 (1961). 
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some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on 
the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In con-
trast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy mak-
ing responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, 
properly rely upon the incumbent Administration's views of 
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not 
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, 
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices-resolving the com-
peting interests which Congress itself either inadvertently 
did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the 
agency charged with the adminstration of the statute in light 
of every day realities. 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 7 
provision, f~ tual!_Zed, really centers on the wisdom 
of the agency's policy, :railierthan whether it is a reasonable 
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must 
fail. In such a case, federal judges-who have no constitu- I ;1 
ency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made V ( 
by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the 
widsom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle be-
tween competing views of the public interest are not judicial 
ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the po-
litical branches." TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 195 (1978). 
We hold that the EP A's definition of the term "source" is a 
permissible construction of the statute which seeks to accom-
modate progress in reducing air pollution with economic 
growth. "The Regulations which the Adminstrator has 
adopted provide what the agency could allowably view as ... 
[an] effective reconciliation of these twofold ends " 
United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S., at 383. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE REHNQUIST did not par-
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